Giving Populism a Bad Name
The Canadian Paradox
Across Europe, the last two decades have witnessed a profound transformation of the political landscape. Populist movements, once relegated to the fringes as protest vehicles with little prospect of governing, have surged into the mainstream and redrawn the boundaries of political possibility. In Italy, the Five Star Movement and the League shattered the established left–right dichotomy, fusing anti-elite rhetoric with nationalist fervor and harnessing digital platforms to mobilize a generation of disaffected voters. France’s Rassemblement National, previously a marginal force known as le Front National and founded by firebrand leader Jean-Marie Le Pen, has completed a dramatic evolution to become a perennial political contender and is now attracting substantial support among younger citizens and working-class communities that once reliably backed the mainstream left. Germany, long considered immune to the centrifugal pull of populism due to its postwar consensus politics, now grapples with the Alternative für Deutschland’s disruptive parliamentary presence, which has forced debates on migration, identity, and national cohesion into the centre of public life. The Netherlands experienced a political jolt with Geert Wilders’ breakthrough, while the Sweden Democrats and the Finns Party have become indispensable actors in coalition-building, upending the consensus-driven norms of Nordic politics. Even in Spain and Portugal where parties such as Vox on the right and Chega on the right, alongside left-populist forces like Podemos have unsettled the established order and accelerated party-system fragmentation. And in the United Kingdom, Nigel Farage has played a uniquely transformative role in mainstreaming populism within a historically stable party system. As the architect of the UK Independence Party’s rise and later the driving force behind the Brexit Party and Reform UK, Farage reframed British politics around sovereignty, immigration, and anti-elite resentment. His relentless pressure campaign not only reshaped the Conservative Party from the outside but also catalyzed the 2016 Brexit referendum; one of the most consequential populist victories in modern European history. Today, with Reform UK siphoning support from both major parties and redefining the terms of debate on borders, identity, and economic grievance, Farage continues to embody the growing normalization of populist politics in a system once seen as resistant to such forces. Taken together, these developments signal that populism in Europe is no longer a transient electoral phenomenon; it has become a structural feature of contemporary politics, steadily reshaping party systems, models of governance, and national narratives across the continent.
Placed against this backdrop of European political turbulence, Canada presents a study in contrasts and contradictions. Populism in Canada occupies a peculiar and ambivalent space. On one hand, Canadians express strong agreement with the grievances and frustrations that fuel populist sentiment elsewhere; distrust of elites, dissatisfaction with political institutions, and a yearning for more responsive governance. On the other, they remain deeply uneasy with the populist label itself and the overt styles of leadership it often entails.
In one of our recent studies, when Canadians are presented with the descriptor “populist” for politicians, their responses are overwhelmingly negative or ambivalent. The term evokes discomfort, hesitation, and a marked emotional distance; in fact, it scores lower than almost every other political descriptor tested, including terms like “progressive,” “moderate,” and “common sense.” Specifically, only about four percent of Canadians register excitement in response to the term, while frustration and anger are far more common. Notably, men, Quebecers, and Bloc Québécois supporters display the most intense emotional reactions - both positive and negative - suggesting that populism stirs stronger feelings in regions or groups where identity and political polarization run deeper.
Regional distinctions further complicate the national picture. Nationwide, only twenty-two percent of Canadians express a positive view of populism, with slightly higher openness in Saskatchewan (twenty-six percent) and Quebec (twenty-five percent), and the lowest level in Manitoba at seventeen percent. Negative sentiment is more widespread, rising to thirty-one percent in Quebec and twenty-nine percent in Ontario.
And yet, despite this general wariness toward the populist brand, the underlying political worldview it represents enjoys broad and robust support. A striking eighty percent of Canadians agree that politicians should follow the will of the people; a core populist demand. A majority of Canadians believe that politicians are beholden to the top one percent (sixty-eight percent), that they should listen less to experts and more to ordinary people (sixty-six percent), and that most politicians do not care about the public (sixty-five percent). Furthermore, fifty-nine percent think that the people and not politicians should make the country’s most important policy decisions, and fifty-seven percent regard compromise in politics as a form of selling out. These attitudes reveal a deep well of skepticism and frustration, even if Canadians hesitate to embrace the populist identity.
This juxtaposition creates Canada’s distinctive populist paradox: populism without populists. Canadians articulate profound frustrations with perceived elite unresponsiveness and systemic unfairness, yet they resist aligning themselves with leaders who explicitly champion populist rhetoric or styles. The appetite is for accountability, fairness, and democratic renewal, but not for the theatrical or aggressively anti-institutional politics that have become common in parts of Europe. Conservative voters show the strongest alignment with populist sentiment, while younger Canadians and men display more polarized emotional reactions. Quebecers are an outlier in several respects: they are more familiar with the concept of populism and more emotionally engaged by it, yet they are less likely than others to endorse populist statements.
Our study suggests a subtle but significant hazard for Canada’s politicians. Canadians may not reward self-described populist leaders and, in fact, overwhelmingly reject figures who embody the style of American right-populism. Yet the grievances that fuel populism elsewhere such as distrust of elites, dissatisfaction with institutions, and a sense of insufficiently responsive governance are undeniably present. Canadians want a system that listens, responds, and reflects their experience. But they seek practical action over ideological confrontation.
This ambivalence may be shaped, in part, by the political climate south of the border. In Pollara’s “Trump Tracker”, data draws a sharp line: Canadians remain overwhelmingly negative toward the former U.S. president, with seventy-three percent expressing an unfavorable impression; a number that has barely budged over time. Fully half of Canadians report feeling angry when asked about Trump, a level of emotional activation that remains exceptionally high. Quebecers are the most negative (seventy-seven percent), while respondents in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta are somewhat less negative, though still solidly opposed. This strong antipathy stands in stark contrast to many European contexts, where populist parties have succeeded in normalizing anti-elite rhetoric, nationalist appeals, and confrontational leadership styles. In Canada, Trump serves as a kind of symbolic firewall - a figure through whom Canadians defines the political behaviors and styles they reject. His presence crystallizes a sentiment that transcends regional, generational, and partisan boundaries: Canadians do not want politics characterized by volatility, anger, and contempt for institutions.
Taken together, the evidence from both populism and Trump-related data points to a Canadian paradox: a society that is resistant to populist leaders yet increasingly shaped by populist pressures, both domestic and imported. The underlying social, economic, and emotional conditions that have enabled populist transformations elsewhere, namely frustration with elites, institutional mistrust, and economic anxiety, are present in Canada, even if they have not yet crystalized into a populist political upheaval. The challenge for Canada’s political leaders is to respond to these undercurrents, addressing the grievances and aspirations of ordinary Canadians but without allowing them to metastasize into the kind of systemic disruption that has upended democracies across Europe. As the United States continues to navigate its own turbulent political landscape, Canada’s future will depend on whether its leaders can recognize and respond to the quiet accumulation of populist sentiment before it erupts into something more destabilizing.